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Thinking  about  the  recent history  and future 
course  of homeland security  will be forever 
tied to a series of events that transpired on  a 
beautiful  Tuesday  morning  in  September 
2001. The attacks on  the United States that 
day  had a  profound effect  on  everyone – 
witness the outpouring of emotion  on  the 
part of the “9/11  generation”  following the 
good news from  Abbottabad. But  those who 
grew  up in  the shadow  of 9/11  will never 
really  know  what  changed that  day. Events 
might  suggest  to them  that people were 
complacent or  careless during  the last  days of 
that  summer.  They  also might  be forgiven  for 
thinking that  people will  again  become 
complacent. After  all, al-Qaeda  is on  the 
ropes and Osama  Bin  Laden  has gone to a 
watery  grave.  Why  should we continue to care 
about  homeland security? But this would be 
an  incorrect  perception  of what  transpired 
during  the last days of that fateful summer; it 
is also wrong  to use that  perception as a 
guide to the future of homeland security. So 
what  about  America and Americans changed 
on  9/11  and what do these changes hold for 
the future?
A GROWING SENSE OF UNEASE
Looking  back  on  the months leading  up to 
9/11,  it  is clear that  the intelligence and law 
enforcement  systems were indeed “blinking 
red.”  Al-Qaeda was on the move and the 
United States was failing  to take effective 
action  to derail  the  terrorist  network. 
Scholars have documented that a  general 
feeling  of unease had spread across 
Washington  that  summer  as various 
government  agencies struggled to assess and 
respond to the emerg ing threat  o f 
transnational terrorism  undertaken  by  non-
state actors. 1  The US government was 
attempting  to head off al-Qaeda  before the 
network could act  on  their  nefarious 
intentions.  Ultimately,  the government  would 
lose that race. 
The academic community  also was aware 
of the emerging  threat  posed by  transnational 
terrorist  networks populated by  non-state 
actors.  Although  I never  considered myself an 
expert  on  terrorism, by  9/11  my  own  work 
covered several topics that  were eerily 
prescient.  I had edited a volume in  which  one 
of the authors described the strategic 
significance and fundamental techniques 
behind the tradecraft  used in 1993  by  the 
terrorists who bombed the World Trade 
Center. 2  The operatives involved in  the 
September  11  attacks also used the same 
tradecraft  by  “hiding in plain  sight”  to 
prevent detection by  intelligence and law 
enforcement  officials. In  the summer of 2001, 
the US Air  Force Institute of National 
Security  Studies also published an  edited 
volume in  which  I suggested that  as the US 
military  bolstered personnel and base 
security  in  the Middle East,  terrorists might 
seek “softer”  domestic targets within  the 
United States.3 Neither  of these articles came 
close to predicting actual events,  but  they  do 
demonstrate that  scholars were turning  their 
attention  to the threat posed by  transnational 
terrorism.
Two personal experiences in  the summer 
of 2001  also stand out  in my  mind. The first 
was a  dinner  conversation I had with  two US 
Customs officers.  The officials had just 
identified and detained a  gentleman from 
Central  Europe who had attempted to use a 
badly  forged Italian  passport  to enter  the 
United States.  The motivations behind the 
forgery  were not  particularly  threatening,  but 
I do remember expounding  at  length  with the 
officials about how  border  security  was 
becoming  the front line of American defense. 
I recognized that it  was imperative to stop 
terrorists from  entering  the country  before 
they  could disappear  into various ethnic 
communities or  the anonymity  of one of our 
great  cities. The customs officers did not 
disagree with  my  position, but  they  also gave 
me the impression  they  thought  I was 
exaggerating  the significance of what  was to 
them a rather mundane action.
The second incident  was a  debate that 
emerged during a conference sponsored by 
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the Defense Threat Reduction  Agency  in 
Norfolk, Virginia. The debate concerned the 
likelihood that the United States would suffer 
a  mass casualty  terrorist  attack. One of the 
speakers suggested that  such an  event  was 
unlikely  because terrorists lacked the 
organizational  and technical skills needed to 
orchestrate  the use of chemical or  biological 
devices to obtain  maximum  lethality.  The 
1996  Aum  Shinrikyo Sarin  attacks on  the 
Tokyo subway  were used to illustrate this 
point.  Despite the fact that the Aum  cult 
possessed significant  resources and much 
technical  expertise, their  effort  to disperse 
Sarin was rudimentary  at  best.  The other 
speaker  did not dispute this assessment of 
Aum’s prowess when  it  came to weaponizing 
Sarin,  but  instead made a  point  well  known 
to social scientists: just because something 
has not  yet  occurred does not guarantee that 
it  will  not  happen  in  the future.  Within a few 
days,  this argument would be settled, but  not 
in a way that the conferees had anticipated.
During  the final  days of that  summer, 
scholars and officials alike were concerned 
about  transnational  terrorism  undertaken by 
shadowy  groups. “Non-state actor”  was a 
f a s h i o n a b l e w a y  t o d e s c r i b e n o n -
governmental organizations that were bent 
on launching  destructive  or  disruptive 
activities. Officials and scholars also knew 
t h a t  b y  b re a ki n g  d o w n b a rr i e rs t o 
t ransportat ion  and communicat ion , 
globalization  and the information revolution 
were making  international  borders highly 
porous.  For  the most part, the availability  of 
these new  conveniences was viewed as a 
positive  development.  For instance,  I 
remember  a trip I made to London  in  July 
2001. I had purchased the plane tickets and 
made the hotel  reservations entirely  online.  I 
also abandoned travelers checks for  the 
airport  automated-teller  machine, which,  I 
was reassured, would allow  me to deduct 
British  pounds directly  from  my  American 
bank account. It was hard to perceive the 
dark side of this new  freedom  as one 
experienced it  for  the first  time. In hindsight, 
it  is easy  to see how  al-Qaeda was able to 
“r ide the ra i ls”  o f the information 
superhighway,  but this mixed metaphor  itself 
conveys how  difficult it  was to envision  how 
terrorists could harness new  technologies to 
create mayhem.
Although  some of them  were quite novel, 
all  of the pieces of the puzzle were available. 
There was a  growing  recognition  that 
globalization  and the information revolution 
were transforming  the security  landscape.  We 
just lacked a  framework to make sense of it 
all.  
THE NEW AGE
As I watched the World Trade Center 
collapse, I was struck by  the audacity  of the 
terrorists and what  I can  best describe as 
hubris, our  hubris.  We had underestimated 
our  opponents and they  had succeeded in 
striking  us in  a  significant way. Theoretical 
concepts such as asymmetric  attack,  porous 
borders, and “hiding in plain  sight”  took on  a 
harsh  reality  as it  became clear  that we had 
lacked a sense of urgency  during the summer 
of 2001. We were living on  borrowed time 
and time had run out.  It  was almost  as if 
Americans were banking on the fact  that  our 
opponents would not have the nerve to attack 
our homeland. Al-Qaeda had plenty of nerve.
It also was immediately  clear  that our 
thinking  about emerging  terrorism  was 
biased towards either  well-understood 
threats (bombing,  shooting,  hostage taking) 
or  more exotic  activities (chemical and 
biological  weapons),  not the real problem  at 
hand. Our  reality  was worse than  our 
imaginations.  Al-Qaeda  was willing to use 
locally  available materials to create death  and 
destruction. They  had identified the high-
e n e r g y  s y s t e m s t h a t  s e r v e d a s t h e 
infrastructure of modern  society  as means to 
attack  the United States.  Instead of chemical 
weapons, for  instance, chemical plants now 
appeared to be a  likely  terrorist  target 
because they  provided access to highly  toxic 
compounds within  urban  areas. Instead of 
using  time and resources to develop their 
own  weapons, Al-Qaeda  recognized that it 
could weaponize our  industrial and 
transportation  infrastructure to attack  us. 
The fact that this infrastructure was not 
entirely  designed to resist  unauthorized or 
unintended uses created a  critical problem 
for  the US. Vulnerabilities had to be 
identified and countermeasures had to be 
adopted before these weaknesses could be 
exploited in another devastating attack.
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I realized from  my  previous work  on the 
topic of intelligence failure that it  quickly 
would become apparent that  scores of 
“signals”  – accurate and timely  pieces of 
information  concerning  what  was about  to 
unfold – were contained within the files and 
systems the intelligence and law  enforcement 
communities maintained. Needless to say, 
officials and analysts had failed to exploit 
fully  the materials that were contained within 
this “intelligence pipeline.”  As would become 
apparent  in  the following  weeks, however, the 
intelligence problem  posed by  transnational 
terrorism  was daunting  because it  crossed 
scores of organizational and jurisdictional 
boundaries.  Information uncovered by  the 
Central Intelligence Agency, for  instance, 
might  have to find its way  to a  local law 
enforcement  agency  to be put  to good use, 
but there was no existing  method to move 
this data  in an operationally  relevant 
timeframe.  And if the information  was highly 
classified,  there was no real way  to move the 
information  at  all.  Local  law  enforcement 
officials lacked the required security 
clearances or  facilities to receive or  store 
classified reports. Additionally,  local law 
enforcement  agencies were now  on  the front 
lines.  Information  collected during a  traffic 
stop,  for  example,  might  be critical to an 
ongoing  analysis by  the Federal  Bureau  of 
Investigation or  Customs officials.  But  there 
was no way  for  local officials to communicate 
information  in  an  operationally  relevant 
timeframe to federal agencies that  focused on 
international threats. Al-Qaeda  was hiding 
within the operational and jurisdictional 
seams that existed between  the US military, 
the intelligence community,  and law 
enforcement  agencies.  The fact that our 
opponents were exploiting these seams 
created a  critical vulnerability  that  had to be 
quickly eliminated. 
9/11  did not “change everything,”  but it 
demonstrated that the threat  posed by 
transnational  terrorism  was real  and 
immediate. Our  opponents had chosen  to 
attack  us; they  had chosen war. The idea  that 
we could respond in  a leisurely  way  to the 
emerging threat,  that  we were somehow 
ahead of the terrorists,  was gone forever.  We 
could not  count  on  controlling  the pace of 
events. It also quickly  became evident that  al-
Qaeda had chosen  to exploit  vulnerabilities 
embedded in the very  infrastructure of 
modern l i fe . Potential threats were 
intermingled within our  cities because scores 
of high energy  or  potentially  toxic systems 
permeated our  infrastructure. Weapons 
suitable for mass destruction  or  mass effect 
were already  in  place within  the United 
States. What the terrorists needed was an 
innovative or  cunning  plan to gain access to 
them. Our  defenses were poorly  configured 
because they  reflected a  sharp distinction 
between foreign  threats, which were 
primarily  the responsibility  of the military 
and intelligence community, and domestic 
threats,  which  were the purview  of law 
enforcement  agencies . There was a 
distinction  between  the “front  lines”  and “the 
rear”  when it came to our thinking  about 
threats. That  distinction no longer  seemed 
appropriate, but  just  about every  resource, 
organization, and concept  we possessed 
reflected distinctions between  foreign  and 
domestic security  as well  as military  or 
intelligence activity  and law  enforcement. 
Overcoming  these weaknesses, which  were 
exploited by  al-Qaeda on  9/11,  animated our 
activities during  the first  homeland security 
decade.
THE FUTURE OF HOMELAND SECURITY
There have been  several important 
developments since that fateful summer. We 
now  recognize the importance of intra-
governmental relations in  defeating the 
terrorism  threat  and the need to share 
information, resources, and best  practices 
across federal,  state,  local  and tribal 
jurisdictions and agencies.  We now 
understand the importance of collaboration 
and cooperation  among  law  enforcement, 
fire,  emergency  medical services,  public 
health,  and intelligence officials to generate 
the situational awareness and capabilities 
needed to combat  the terrorism  threat. We 
also recognize that  we have to work to bridge 
the boundaries between jurisdictions and 
agencies to prevent our  opponents from 
operating within the seams of our defenses.
Today, homeland security  programs and 
policies are less animated by  a  crisis 
atmosphere and instead reflect  the notion 
that  emerging  best practices have to be 
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embedded within a  wider  range of 
intelligence,  law  enforcement,  and other 
public service  programs. In  a  domestic 
setting,  the activities of most  public officials 
and agencies are directed at meeting  myriad 
demands for support  and services that have 
little to do with  transnational terrorism. 
Programs that are intended to respond to the 
ongoing  threat of terrorism  have to help 
bolster  capabilities when it  comes to the “all-
source threat”  focus of the vast  majority  of 
law  enforcement, fire,  public  health, and 
emergency  medical service agencies across 
the country. Instead of remaining  an 
“extraordinary”  activity,  homeland security  in 
the United States is becoming  part of 
everyday  life because it  is slowly  but surely 
improving  the ability  of federal, state, local 
and tribal agencies to prevent  and respond 
more quickly  and effectively  to all  sorts of 
threats and incidents.
For  theoretical, practical, and operational 
reasons,  incorporating  an  “all-threat” 
approach  to homeland security  is a  positive 
development. From  a  theoretical perspective, 
it  is difficult to anticipate the exact  nature 
and best response to future threats.  It  is 
better  to foster  broad situational  awareness 
across a  variety  of jurisdictions and 
disciplines (e.g., border  patrol, public health, 
or  the chemical industry), to look for 
unanticipated developments or  new  patterns 
of potentially  disruptive activity.  From  a 
practical perspective,  it  is simply  not 
politically  possible to devote large portions of 
scarce public funds to respond to a mercifully 
rare type of event  (i.e., a  mass casualty 
terrorism  attack), while communities suffer 
from  a long  list of mundane problems. 
Homeland security  initiatives that  help 
communities respond to local problems will 
enjoy  greater  political  support than  activities 
that  seem  to deal with  rarified issues of little 
immediate significance. From  an operational 
perspective, an  “all  threat”  approach  can  help 
improve communication  across disciplines, 
agencies, and levels of government  because it 
fosters better  interaction  in dealing  with 
everyday  events.  By  making  data fusion  and 
operational  cooperation  a  matter  of routine, 
“all-threat”  collaboration can serve as the 
basis for prompt  detection  and defense 
against a potential terrorist incident. 
There is also evidence that  our  overall 
situational  awareness and response protocols 
continue to improve. The quick and effective 
action taken  by  local bystanders and patrol 
officers during the 2010  Time Square 
bombing incident suggests that average 
Americans feel  empowered to respond to 
suspicious situations and that  police and fire 
departments possess appropriate procedures 
once suspicious activity  is reported.  The car 
bomb in Times Square failed to detonate,  but 
if it had,  quick  action  by  the New  York  City 
police and fire departments would have 
helped to limit casualties from a bomb blast.
Because the attitudes of Americans have 
changed, efforts to improve homeland 
security  are now  embedded in  a  general way 
in  public  policy  and our  attitude towards 
national security. Ten  years after  9/11, the 
c r i s i s a t m o s p h e r e h a s f a d e d ,  b u t 
organizations and agencies everywhere 
recognize the imperative to strengthen 
homeland security  and to include homeland 
security  “best practices”  across a  range of 
public service activities and agencies.  The 
emergence of homeland security  as a 
“process”  is a phenomena  that  will gain 
strength  in the years ahead. This process has 
already  stopped several  significant  terrorist 
plots before they  could unfold.  It  also has 
made the United States a  far  less hospitable 
place for clandestine terrorist networks.  
CONCLUSION
Before 9/11  it  might have been possible to 
write this essay, but I doubt that it  would 
have been  published. The threats described 
would have appeared implausible.  Reviewers 
might  have granted me the fact  that 
launching  a  mass casualty  terrorist  attack 
using  materials at hand was possible,  but 
such  an  act would have appeared to lack 
strategic justification. I also doubt  that 
manuscript reviewers would have been 
willing to grant  that our opponents possessed 
the motivation  or  operational  skill to pull off 
this type of operation, or  could easily  slip 
through  our  security  measures.  In other 
words,  one could have posited a  perfect  storm 
attack,  (e.g., terrorists armed only  with  box 
cutters succeed in  destroying  the World 
Trade Center  in a  few  hours),  but it  would 
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have been  dismissed as either  alarmist  or 
foolhardy.
The fact  that we now  believe that  we could 
(again)  be the victim  of a  mass casualty 
terrorist  attack  and that it  is a  mistake to 
u n d e r e s t i m a t e t h e i n g e n u i t y  a n d 
determination  of our  opponents marks the 
most important  way  Americans have changed 
in  the aftermath  of the September  11  attacks. 
This is the greatest lesson we learned on  that 
last day  of that  summer. We no longer are 
living  on  borrowed time, we are working to 
recognize and overcome our weaknesses. 
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